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Brief of Amici Curiae
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'
Amici curiae are professors with expertise in federal jurisdiction
and legal history who have an interest in the proper understanding
and interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and of the provision of
that Act commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
Petitioner and other amici who have already filed briefs in this case
have advanced certain arguments that are, in our view, inconsistent
with the history and text of the ATS. We respectfully submit this
brief in order to clarify the history of the ATS and how that history
bears upon its proper interpretation. We take no position on the
second question presented (the law-of-nations standard for
determining which torts are actionable under the ATS) or on the
third question presented (whether the specific torts at issue in this
case are actionable under the ATS).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act provided that the district
courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." An Act to establish the Judicial Courts
of the United States ("Judiciary Act"), ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77
(1789). This provision, commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.2 Petitioner argues that
the First Congress did not intend for aliens to be able to bring suits
under the ATS for torts in violation of the law of nations unless
Congress passed a further statute authorizing such suits. Other amici
1. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or
entity other than the amici curiae or their counsel made any monetary contribution to the
preparation and submission of this brief. Petitioner and respondent have given blanket
consents to the filing of amicus briefs. The written consent of the United States
accompanies
this brief.
2. As presently codified, § 1350 reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350. It has never been suggested
that any change in wording upon codification was intended to alter the scope of this
provision.
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argue in the alternative that jurisdiction under the ATS is limited to a
category of suits narrower than "all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations." 1 Stat. at 77. As a
historical matter, these arguments are mistaken. The history and text
of the ATS establish three basic propositions: (1) the First Congress
intended to provide a federal forum for alien tort suits; (2) the First
Congress understood such suits to be cognizable at common law
without the need for further congressional action; and (3) the First
Congress intended the district courts to have jurisdiction over "all"
such torts, not just those that occurred within the territory of the
United States or those that were recognized in 1789.?
ARGUMENT
Properly framed, the question in this case is not whether the ATS
itself creates a cause of action, but rather whether the First Congress
understood that further congressional action would be necessary
before aliens could bring suits for torts in violation of the law of
nations. Petitioner's argument assumes that a right to sue may be
created only by statute. The history and text of the ATS
demonstrate, to the contrary, that the First Congress understood that
torts in violation of the law of nations were cognizable at common
law. The history and text of the ATS further show that the First
Congress intended to provide a federal forum for these suits and that
the district courts' jurisdiction should extend to "all" such suits.
I. THE FIRST CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A
FEDERAL FORUM FOR CASES WHERE AN ALIEN
SUES FOR A TORT ONLY IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government
had little authority to provide remedies for violations of the law of
3. As Professor Casto has noted, "[n]otwithstanding frequent complaints about the
obscurity of section 1350's origins, a thorough study of available historical materials
provides a fairly clear understanding of the statute's purpose." William R. Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 488-89 (1986); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1985); Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter], The Alien Tort Statute and the
Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); William S. Dodge,
The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L REV. 221 (1996).
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nations. This experience proved to the First Congress the importance
of providing a federal forum for such violations. As James Madison
complained, "[t]hese articles [of confederation] contain no provision
for the case of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently
leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the
Confederacy with foreign nations." THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at
264, 265 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). Although suits for torts
in violation of the law of nations could have been brought in state
court, the Framers thought a federal forum was important in order to
promote uniformity in the interpretation of the law of nations,
because they feared that state courts might be hostile to alien claims,
and because they felt it was their duty to provide that the law of
nations be respected and obeyed.
A. THE EXPERIENCE UNDER THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION DEMONSTRATED THAT
TORTS IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
SHOULD NOT BE LEFT EXCLUSIVELY TO
THE STATES.
The problem of redressing violations of the law of nations arose
repeatedly during the decade before passage of the First Judiciary
Act, and the Continental Congress consistently demonstrated its
concern with providing not just criminal penalties but also civil
damages. As early as 1779, the Congress wrote to assure the Minister
Plenipotentiary of France that the courts "will cause the law of
nations to be most strictly observed: that if it shall be found, after due
trial, that the owners of the captured vessels have suffered damage
from the misapprehension or violation of the rights of war or
neutrality, Congress will cause reparation to be made..." 14
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at
635 (W.C. Ford ed., 1909). But while the Articles of Confederation
gave the national government and its courts authority over violations
of the law of nations on the high seas, see ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, art. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 4, 6 (1778), the national
government lacked authority over such violations on land.
To address this problem, the Continental Congress passed a
resolution in 1781 recommending to the States that they "provide
expeditious, exemplary and adequate punishment" for violations of
the law of nations and treaties to which the United States was a party.
21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789,
at 1136-37 (G. Hunt ed., 1912). The resolution listed several law-of
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nations violations, including violations of safe-conducts and
"infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public
ministers." Id.' It also recommended that the States "erect a tribunal
in each State, or... vest one already existing with power to decide on
offences against the law of nations, not contained in the foregoing
enumeration." Id. at 1137. Finally, the resolution recommended that
the States "authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the party
injured, and for compensation to the United States for damage
sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign power by a
citizen." Id.5 The Congress thus
envisioned two types of civil suits: (1) tort suits by the injured
party against the tortfeasor, and (2) suits by the United States against
the tortfeasor to indemnify it for compensation paid to the injured
party. This 1781 resolution of the Continental Congress is
acknowledged to be "the direct precursor of the alien tort provision
in the First Judiciary Act." Slaughter, supra, at 477; see also Dodge,
supra, at 226-29; Casto, supra, at 490-91. The following year,
Connecticut passed "An Act for securing to Foreigners in this State,
their Rights, according to the Laws of Nations, and to prevent any
Infractions of said Laws," which criminalized specific violations of the
law of nations and "any other Infractions or Violations of or Offenses
against the known received and established Laws of civilized
Nations." See Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, in America
82, 83 (1784). The Connecticut act also provided a broad tort remedy
for injuries "to any foreign Power, or to the Subjects thereof." Id.
The 1784 Marbois Affair highlighted the importance of
redressing violations of the law of nations. In May 1784, the
Chevalier De Longchamps, a French citizen, assaulted Francis Barbe
Marbois, the French Consul General, on a Philadelphia street. See
4. The enumeration followed Blackstone, who stated that "[t]he principal offences
against the law of nations.., are of three kinds; 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2.
Infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and, 3. Piracy." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *68. The resolution made no mention of piracy because Congress
had exclusive authority under the Articles of Confederation to provide for the trial of
piracies. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 4, 6 (1778) ("The
United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power
of... appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas...").
5. As Professor Casto has explained, "[tihe citizen limitation literally applies only to
the indemnity action by the United States and is separated from the recommended alien's
tort claim provision by a comma. This different treatment makes sense because it is very
unlikely that the United States would pay compensation for an injury done by a non-
citizen." Casto, supra, at 499 n.179.
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Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111 (1784). "The
Marbois Affair was a national sensation that attracted the concern of
virtually every public figure in America." Casto, supra, at 492. The
French Ambassador formally complained to the Continental
Congress, and the Dutch Ambassador threatened to leave the State
unless action was taken. See id. at 491-92 & n.138. De Longchamps
was ultimately tried and convicted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court for an offense against the law of nations, which the court held
to be "in its full extent,.., part of the law of this State." De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 116. But the national government
was powerless. As the Congress explained to Marbois, its authority
was limited by "the nature of a federal union in which each State
retains a distinct and absolute sovereignty in all matters not expressly
delegated to Congress leaving to them only that of advising in many
of those cases in which other governments decree." 28 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 314 (J.C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933). When a similar incident involving the Dutch
Ambassador in New York City arose four years later, John Jay, then
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, complained that "the federal
Government does not appear.., to be vested with any judicial
Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases."
34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789,
at 111 (R.R. Hill ed., 1937).
The new Constitution at last gave the national government
authority to redress violations of the law of nations, and the First
Congress acted swiftly to implement the recommendations of the
1781 resolution. It passed an act providing criminal penalties for
violations of safe-conducts and assaults on ambassadors and public
ministers. See An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against
the United States, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (1790). It gave the
federal courts jurisdiction over crimes "cognizable under the
authority of the United States," Judiciary Act, ch. 20, §§ 9 & 11, 1
Stat. at 76-77, 78-79, which would have included both statutory and
common-law offenses against the law of nations. See Charles
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 73, 77 (1923); Stewart Jay, Origins of
Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1016
(1985).6 And it implemented the 1781 resolution's recommendation
on civil suits by granting the district courts jurisdiction over "all
6. This Court later limited federal criminal jurisdiction to statutory offenses. See
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1
Stat. at 77. In each case, Oliver Ellsworth appears to have played a
leading role. Ellsworth had been a member of both the Continental
Congress that passed the 1781 resolution and the Connecticut
General Assembly that passed the 1782 act. See Dodge, supra, at 231.
He chaired the Senate committee that reported the Act for the
Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, see Casto,
supra, at 495 n.156, and was the principal drafter of the First Judiciary
Act, specifically authoring Section 9, which contains the alien tort
provision.7
B. A FEDERAL FORUM WAS IMPORTANT TO
PROMOTE UNIFORMITY, TO AVOID HOSTILE
STATE COURTS, AND TO DISCHARGE THE
NATION'S DUTY TO PROVIDE REDRESS FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS.
Suits for torts that violated the law of nations could have been
brought in state courts, and indeed the ATS specified that the district
courts' jurisdiction over these torts would be "concurrent with the
courts of the several States." Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.8
There were several reasons, however, for the First Congress to make
a federal forum available. First, providing a federal forum would
promote uniformity in the interpretation of the law of nations. John
Jay expressed this idea in defending the new Constitution's grant of
judicial power:
Under the national government, treaties ... as well as the laws of
nations, will always be expounded in one sense.., whereas
adjudications on the same points and questions in thirteen States...
will not always accord or be consistent... The wisdom of the
convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government cannot be too much commended.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 41, 43 (J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475, 476 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) ("cases arising upon treaties and
the laws of nations... may be supposed proper for the federal
7. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act was Section 10 of the bill submitted to Congress,
and this section appears in Ellsworth's handwriting. See Warren, supra, at 50, 73.
8. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary are addressed at length in Part II.
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jurisdiction.").9
Second, the First Congress had reason to fear that state courts
would be hostile to aliens' claims. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish
Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the
Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1440-53 (discussing the
difficulties that British creditors had collecting their debts in state
courts). As James Madison put it while defending the Constitution's
grant of alienage jurisdiction: "We well know, sir, that foreigners
cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts, and this has
prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among
us.,' 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 583 (J. Elliot ed., 1836).
Third, the First Congress viewed it as the duty of every
government to provide redress for violations of the law of nations.
Blackstone had written that "where the individuals of any state
violate this general law [of nations], it is then the interest as well as
duty of the government under which they live, to animadvert upon
them with a becoming severity, that the peace of the world may be
maintained." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *68 (emphasis added). In
the De Longchamps case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
similarly emphasized that it was "the interest as well as duty of the
government" to punish violations of the law of nations. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 117 (emphasis added). When the
United States gained independence, that duty became its duty. In
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), Chief Justice John
Jay observed that "the United States had, by taking a place among
the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations; and
it was their interest as well as their duty to provide, that those laws
should be respected and obeyed." Id. at 474 (emphasis added). As
Professor Slaughter has written, "[t]he Alien Tort Statue was a direct
response to what the Founders understood to be the nation's duty to
propagate and enforce those international law rules that directly
regulated individual conduct." Slaughter, supra, at 475; see also id. at
481-88.
Petitioner would have this Court believe that Oliver Ellsworth
and the other members of the First Congress, having been concerned
to provide civil redress for violations of the law of nations for at least
9. The ATS did not guarantee uniformity in the interpretation of the law of nations,
since aliens were free to bring their tort claims in state courts, but it at least gave aliens the
option of seeking a uniform federal interpretation.
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a decade, and having gone to the trouble to implement the
recommendations of the 1781 resolution in the Judiciary Act and
other legislation, suddenly had second thoughts and decided not to
enact the further statute necessary to authorize suits. There is no
support in the historical record for this proposition. Instead, as
explained below, it is clear that Congress thought no further statute
was necessary because torts in violation of the law of nations were
cognizable at common law.
II. THE FIRST CONGRESS UNDERSTOOD THAT TORTS IN
VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS WERE
COGNIZABLE AT COMMON LAW WITHOUT THE
NEED FOR FURTHER ACTION BY CONGRESS.
Congress did not create a statutory right of action for torts in
violation of the law of nations because it did not believe that any was
necessary. Professor Bradley has explained:
[T]here would have been no reason for the First Congress to
create a federal statutory cause of action for torts in violation of the
law of nations. The law of nations was considered at that time to be
part of the general common law, which could be applied by courts in
the absence of controlling positive law to the contrary.
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 587, 595 (2002).
A. THE LAW OF NATIONS WAS UNDERSTOOD TO
BE PART OF THE COMMON LAW.
Blackstone had written that "the law of nations... is... adopted
in its [sic] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of
the law of the land." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *67. In America,
state and federal courts regularly applied the law of nations as
common law in both criminal and civil cases. In convicting De
Longchamps for the assault on Marbois by an indictment at common
law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that "the law of
Nations ... , in its full extent, is part of the law of this State." De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 116. During the 1790's, federal
authorities also brought indictments at common law for violations of
the law of nations. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations
in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 842-45 (1989); Jay,
Origins, supra. As Justice James Iredell stated when charging the
grand jury in one of these prosecutions, "[t]he Common Law of
[Vol. 28:95
England, from which our own is derived, fully recognizes the
principles of the Law of Nations, and applies them in all cases falling
under its jurisdiction, where the nature of the subject requires it."
Charge to the Grand Jury of Justice James Iredell for the District of
South Carolina (May 12, 1794), quoted in Jay, Law of Nations, supra,
at 825.
The law of nations also applied as common law in civil cases.
Blackstone reported, for example, that "in mercantile questions, such
as bills of exchange and the like.., the law merchant, which is a
branch of the law of nations, is regularly and constantly adhered to."
4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *67. The same was true in America. In
a comprehensive study of the subject, Professor Fletcher noted that
"[a]ll American courts, state and federal, relied on the general law
merchant in commercial cases." William A. Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984);
see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 824 (1997) ("the law of nations...
had the legal status of general common law").
As common law, the law of nations applied in both state and
federal courts. Early American writers "generally asserted that the
law of nations was part of the law of the new American states and
their national government." Jay, Law of Nations, supra, at 825; see
also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (1984) ("Early in our history, the question
whether international law was state or federal law was not an issue: it
was 'the common law."'). Moreover, because it was part of the
common law, the law of nations required no legislative enactment to
be effective. As Attorney General Edmund Randolph noted in an
early opinion, "[t]he law of nations, although not specially adopted by
the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of
the land." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792).
B. THE TEXT OF SECTION 9 MAKES CLEAR THAT
NO FURTHER ACTION BY CONGRESS WAS
NECESSARY.
The text of Section 9 confirms that no further action by Congress
was necessary for suits to be brought under the ATS. First, there is
the word "tort." Although "tort law was not a highly developed
field" in the late eighteenth century, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
20041 Brief of Amici Curiae
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 261 (1973), there is no
escaping the fact that the First Congress deliberately used this word,
which had a definite meaning. Blackstone used the word "tort" to
describe actions "whereby a man claims a satisfaction in damages for
some injury done to his person or property" such as "actions for
trespasses, nusances [sic], assaults, defamatory words, and the like." 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *117. Such actions
required no statutory authorization, and the injured party might
obtain a "remedy by suit or action in the courts of common law.. ." 3
id. at *118; see also 3 id. at *123 ("wherever the common law gives a
right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action"). While
Blackstone's discussion of offenses against the law of nations focused
on criminal penalties, see 4 id. at *68-73, he understood that crimes
and torts would sometimes overlap, noting that in cases of assault or
battery, for example, "an indictment may be brought as well as an
action; and frequently both are accordingly prosecuted: the one at the
suit of the crown for the crime against the public; the other at the suit
of the party injured, to make him a reparation in damages." 3 id. at
*121. Pennsylvania indicted De Longchamps at common law for "an
infraction of the law of nations," De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at
116, but Marbois could also have brought a common-law tort action
against De Longchamps for assault. To deny Marbois that right
unless a statute specifically authorized the action would have been to
treat torts in violation of the law of nations less favorably than other
torts, and it strains belief to suggest that this was the Framers'
understanding.
Second, the district courts' jurisdiction under the ATS was
expressly made "concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts, as the case may be." 1 Stat. at 77. The provision
for jurisdiction "concurrent with.., the circuit courts" confirms that
suits for torts in violation of the law of nations were cognizable at
common law, because the concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit courts
could only have been the jurisdiction granted in Section 11 of the
Judiciary Act over "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars." 1 Stat. at 78 (emphasis added).
If Petitioner were correct that suits for torts in violation of the law of
nations could only be brought under a federal statute and not at
common law, then the circuit courts would have lacked jurisdiction
over these cases under Section 11 and the ATS's reference to the
concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit courts would be rendered
meaningless. Finally, the fact that the district courts' jurisdiction
[Vol. 28:95Hastings Int'l & Comp) Rev.
under the ATS was to be "concurrent with the courts of the several
States" belies Petitioner's assertion that suits for torts in violation of
the law of nations could not be brought in state court. See Casto,
supra, at 508-10.'o
Third, a comparison of Section 9's alien tort provision with the
other clauses of Section 9 indicates that no further congressional
action was necessary before suits could be brought. Section 9
contains six clauses vesting jurisdiction in the district courts, of which
the ATS is the fourth. The first three clauses contemplated that
Congress might enact legislation under which a criminal prosecution
or civil suit could be brought, but the last three did not. The first,
second, and third clauses of Section 9 gave the district courts
jurisdiction over: (1) "all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable
under the authority of the United States... where no other
punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not
exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not
exceeding six months, is to be inflicted;"'" (2) "all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws
of impost, navigation or trade of the United States... ;" and (3) "all
10. Petitioner's argument that torts in violation of the law of nations could not be
heard in state court rests heavily on the fact that the Continental Congress's 1781
resolution recommended that the States "authorise suits to be instituted for damages by
the party injured" and that the 1782 Connecticut act did just that. Petitioner's Brief 21-23.
From this, Petitioner infers that such suits could not otherwise have been brought. This
inference is mistaken for three reasons. First, it ignores the fact that the law of nations
was considered to be part of the common law. Second, it was not unusual for legislatures
at that time to pass statutes that would limit, expand, or simply restate the law of nations.
See Bradley, supra, at 595 ("The law of nations was considered at that time to be part of
the general common law, which could be applied by courts in the absence of controlling
positive law to the contrary."); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1280 (1996) ("In essence, the law of nations
operated as a set of background rules that courts applied in the absence of any binding
sovereign command to the contrary."). Indeed, Blackstone viewed the acts of parliament
dealing with the law of nations simply as restatements of the law that would have applied
even in their absence. See 4 B LACKSTONE, supra, at *67 ("those acts of parliament,
which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the
execution of it's [sic] decisions, are not to be considered as introductive of any new rule,
but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom"). Third,
both the 1781 resolution and 1782 Connecticut act did go beyond the existing common
law, not by authorizing a suit for damages by the injured party but rather by authorizing
an indemnity action by the United States if it chose to compensate the injured party out of
the public treasury. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra,
at 1137; Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, in America, supra, at 83. The 1781
resolution and the Connecticut act were not superfluous, therefore, even though torts in
violation of the law of nations were already cognizable in state courts at common law.
11. In cases where the punishments exceeded those limits, jurisdiction was given to
the circuit courts. 1 Stat. at 78-79.
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seizures ... and... all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred,
under the laws of the United States." 1 Stat. at 6-77. If Congress
passed criminal legislation, "laws of impost, navigation or trade"
providing for seizures, or other "laws of the United States" providing
for penalties and forfeitures, these three clauses would provide the
district courts with jurisdiction. It is worth noting, however, that at
least with respect to the first two jurisdictional clauses further
legislation was not necessary. Admiralty jurisdiction over prize cases
and private disputes would exist without further congressional
authorization, and it was assumed throughout the 1790's that the
district courts would have jurisdiction over indictments at common
law even in the absence of a federal criminal statute."
The fourth, fifth, and sixth clauses of Section 9, on the other
hand, gave the district courts jurisdiction over: (4) "all causes where
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States;" (5) "all suits at common law where the
United States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts, exclusive of
costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars;" and (6) "all suits
against consuls or vice-consuls.. ." 1 Stat. at 77. Importantly, in none
of these clauses is there any mention of "laws of the United States,"
as one finds in Section 9's second and third clauses. The fifth clause
clearly anticipates suits by the United States "at common law." So
does the fourth, since the law of nations was understood to be part of
the common law. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *67. And the
sixth, which was designed to protect foreign officials from being sued
in state court, is broad enough to encompass suits at common law or
pursuant to a statute." Finally, it is worth noting that in the first three
clauses, where Congress might have been expected to pass further
legislation authorizing suits, the district courts' jurisdiction was
exclusive of the state courts. By contrast, in the fourth and fifth
clause, where suits were expected to be brought at common law, the
12. As noted earlier, throughout the 1790's the United States continued to bring
criminal indictments at common law, particularly for violations of the law of nations. See
Jay, Law of Nations, supra, at 842-45; Jay, Origins, supra. Indeed, Ellsworth himself
would instruct a grand jury that violations of the law of nations were punishable as
common-law crimes. See Grand Jury Charge of Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Circuit
Court for the District of South Carolina (May 15, 1799), reprinted in Jay, Origins, supra, at
1114 app.
13. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act further gave this Court original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all suits against ambassadors, other public ministers, and their domestics
and original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all suits brought by ambassadors or other
public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul was a party. 1 Stat. at 80-81. Again,
this jurisdiction would have included suits at common law.
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district courts' jurisdiction was concurrent with that of the state
courts. Petitioner analogizes the ATS to the third clause of Section 9
providing for exclusive jurisdiction over "all suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States."
Petitioner's Brief 14. For Petitioner's analogy to work, however, the
language of the ATS would have to provide jurisdiction over "all
causes where an alien sues under the laws of the United States for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." But the italicized language does not appear in the text that
Congress passed. Surely the more apt analogy is to the fifth clause of
Section 9 conferring jurisdiction over suits by the United States at
common law, which like the ATS lacks the "under the laws of the
United States" language and makes the district courts' jurisdiction
concurrent with the courts of the several States.
In short, Petitioner's assertion that "[l]ike the other clauses of
Section 9, the ATS granted district courts jurisdiction to hear causes
of action that Congress created elsewhere," id. 12, is mistaken. Only
the third clause of Section 9 required Congress separately to create a
right to sue. The ATS, like each of the other clauses, did not.
C. CONTEMPORANEOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE ATS CONFIRM THAT NO FURTHER
ACTION BY CONGRESS WAS NECESSARY TO
AUTHORIZE SUIT.
Early interpretations of the ATS also show that aliens were
presumed to have a remedy under the provision without the need for
a further congressional enactment. In 1795, Attorney General
William Bradford was asked to opine on the actions that might be
taken against Americans who had helped the French attack the
British colony of Sierra Leone. Bradford, who had been the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania and chief prosecutor in the Marbois Affair,
see De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 113; Casto, supra, at 503 n.201,
expressed some doubt whether the offenders could be criminally
prosecuted in the courts of the United States. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
58-59 (1795). He continued:
But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil
suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly
given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in
violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States...
Id. at 59. In Bradford's view, no additional statute was necessary
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to authorize the aliens' suit. All that was needed for those injured to
have "a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States" was
the ATS's grant of "jurisdiction." 4
The ATS was also interpreted in two federal cases during the
1790's. In Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607),
a French privateer captured as prize a Spanish vessel carrying slaves
mortgaged to a British citizen. In port, the mortgagee's agent seized
and sold the slaves, and the privateer sued for the proceeds. There
was some doubt that the suit fell within the district court's admiralty
jurisdiction because the seizure had been made on land but, the court
continued:
[A]s the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress.., gives this
court concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of
the United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law
of nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all doubt upon
this point.
Id. at 810. The Bolchos court did not even consider the
possibility that the privateer's tort suit could not be brought because
Congress had not passed a separate statute authorizing it. In Moxon
v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895), a French
privateer captured a British ship within the territorial waters of the
United States, and the owners sought restitution of the ship and its
cargo as well as damages for its detention. The district court stated in
dictum that the suit could not be maintained under the ATS-not
because Congress had failed to pass a separate statute authorizing the
suit, but because "[ilt cannot be called a suit for a tort only, when the
property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought
for." Id. at 948.
In sum, the language and structure of Section 9, as well as the
contemporaneous interpretations of the ATS, confirm that no
14. Petitioner attempts to minimize the significance of this interpretation by arguing
that "[a]t a time when the Washington Administration was stretching the common law
past the breaking point to prosecute conduct that did not violate federal law.., it is not
surprising that the Attorney General would overstate the ATS's scope." Petitioner's Brief
38 n.13. In fact, Bradford's opinion was quite careful not to overstate the reach of federal
criminal jurisdiction. He stated that "[s]o far ... as the transactions complained of
originated or took place in a foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of our
courts." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58 (emphasis added). He further discussed the possibility of
an indictment for crimes committed on the high seas, but thought U.S. jurisdiction
doubtful because of the limits of the federal criminal statute. See id. at 58-59 ("But some
doubt rests on this point, in consequence of the terms in which the 'Act in addition to the
act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States' is expressed."). These
are not the words of a person who was overstating the reach of U.S. jurisdiction.
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additional action by Congress was necessary to authorize alien tort
suits. "In 1789, it was understood that the common law provided the
right to sue for a tort in violation of the law of nations, just as it
provided the right to sue for any other kind of tort." Dodge, supra, at
237-38.
III. THE FIRST CONGRESS INTENDED THE DISTRICT
COURTS TO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER "ALL"
CAUSES WHERE AN ALIEN SUES FOR A TORT ONLY
IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS.
Petitioner's amici suggest, in the alternative, that jurisdiction
under the ATS should be limited to a subcategory of torts in violation
of the law of nations. The United States suggests that this Court
should apply the presumption against extraterritoriality and hold that
the ATS reaches torts in violation of the law of nations only when
they occur within the United States. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner 53-57. The Washington
Legal Foundation suggests that this Court should limit the ATS to
those torts that violated the law of nations in 1789. Brief of
Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner 9-13. The history and text of the ATS support neither
interpretation.15
A. THE FIRST CONGRESS INTENDED THE ATS TO
REACH TORTS IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS THAT OCCURRED ABROAD.
The text of the ATS contains no geographical limitation, and
15. Amici Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction, and Foreign
Relations Law briefly raise two other limiting constructions, neither of which is historically
well-founded. First, they suggest that the ATS was meant to apply only to certain
maritime torts. Brief for Professors of International Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner 28. This suggestion, first made in Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995), distorts
the text of the ATS and would have made it redundant because these same torts already
fell within the district courts' admiralty jurisdiction. See Dodge, supra, at 243-56. Second,
these amici suggest that the ATS was meant to apply only when the defendant was a U.S.
citizen. Brief for Professors of International Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner 28- 29. This suggestion, made in Bradley, supra, would mean that cases like the
Marbois Affair would be excluded from the scope of the ATS and is also inconsistent with
the ATS's text and early interpretations. See William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of
the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 691-
701 (2002).
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"[t]he broad wording of the statute clearly encompasses torts without
regard to the place of their commission." Casto, supra, at 503. This
lack of geographical limitation stands in sharp contrast to the first
clause of Section 9, which gave the district courts jurisdiction over "all
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of
the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon
the high seas .. ." 1 Stat. at 76-77 (emphasis added). In the late-18th
Century, tort actions were considered to be transitory and could be
brought wherever the tortfeasor was found. See Mostyn v. Fabrigas,
98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774) (Mansfield, C.J.). The established rule
in criminal cases, by contrast, was that "[c]rimes are in their nature
local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local." Rafael v. Verelst, 96
Eng. Rep. 621, 622 (C.P. 1776) (De Grey, C.J.). Oliver Ellsworth had
applied the doctrine of transitory torts as a judge in Connecticut, see
Stoddard v. Bird, 1 Kirby 65, 68 (Conn. 1786) (Ellsworth, J.) ("Right
of action [for a tort] against an administrator is transitory, and the
action may be brought wherever he is found."), and the text of the
ATS simply reflects his understanding that the district courts would
have jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of nations
regardless of where those torts occurred.
Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion confirms that suits for
torts in violation of the law of nations that occurred abroad could be
brought in district court under the ATS. As was discussed above,
Bradford was asked what actions might be taken against Americans
who had helped the French attack the British colony of Sierra Leone.
Reflecting the common understanding of criminal jurisdiction, he first
noted that "[s]o far.., as the transactions complained of originated
or took place in a foreign country, they are not within the cognizance
of our courts; nor can the actors be legally prosecuted or punished for
them by the United States." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58. But Bradford
proceeded to contrast the jurisdiction of United States courts over
tort actions, stating that "there can be no doubt" that the injured
aliens "have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States;
jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an
alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a
treaty of the United States." Id. at 59.
Bradford clearly did not think that the presumption against
extraterritoriality limited the district courts' jurisdiction under the
ATS, although this presumption was well established at the time. See,
e.g., Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808); United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824). The simple explanation is that the ATS
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did not provide for the extraterritorial application of United States
law. Instead, it provided jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes under a
law that was already binding everywhere in the world-the law of
nations. A district court hearing a suit based on a tort in violation of
the law of nations that occurred in Sierra Leone would not be
prescribing rules of conduct for parties in a foreign country but would
rather be enforcing rules of law that were as binding in Sierra Leone
as they were in the United States. 6 It was not at all unusual for courts
at that time to hear cases that arose abroad. Alexander Hamilton
noted:
The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own
local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of
litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe.
Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of
legal discussion to our courts.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 491, 493 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra, at 556 (J. Marshall) ("If a man
contracted a debt in the East Indies, and it was sued for here, the
decision must be consonant to the laws of that country."). In 1789, as
today, U.S. courts would decide cases that arose abroad without any
suggestion that they were exercising an impermissible,
"extraterritorial" jurisdiction.
B. THE FIRST CONGRESS EXPECTED THE LAW OF
NATIONS TO EVOLVE.
The argument that jurisdiction under the ATS should be limited
to those torts in violation of the law of nations that were recognized
in 1789 is also contrary to the First Congress's understanding.
Statesmen of that era understood that the law of nations had evolved
16. In modern terms, the United States' argument based on the presumption against
extraterritoriality makes the mistake of confusing jurisdiction to adjudicate with
jurisdiction to prescribe. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1986) (distinguishing jurisdiction
to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce). The European
Commission's argument that jurisdiction under the ATS should be defined by reference to
customary international law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe rests on the same
misunderstanding. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of
Neither Party 12-26.
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and would continue to do so. In discussing the rights of neutral
traders, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson referred to "the
principles of that law [of nations] as they have been liberalized in
latter times by the refinement of manners & morals, and evidenced by
the Declarations, Stipulations, and Practice of every civilized Nation."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (May 7, 1793), in
7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 312, 314 (P.L. Ford
ed., 1904). Justice Wilson similarly declared in Ware v. Hilton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199 (1796), that "[w]hen the United States declared their
independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement." Id. at 281 (Wilson, J.,
concurring); see also Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 32
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 430-31 (J.C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (referring to "the modern usage of nations");
Charge to the Grand Jury of Justice James Iredell for the District of
South Carolina (May 12, 1794), quoted in Jay, Law of Nations, supra,
at 824 (noting that the law of nations had been expounded "with a
spirit of freedom and enlarged liberality of mind entirely suited to the
high improvements the present age has made in all kinds of political
reasoning"). Justice Story captured the late-18th Century
understanding of the law of nations when he wrote: "It does not
follow.., that because a principle cannot be found settled by the
consent or practice of nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that
at no subsequent period the principle can be considered as
incorporated into the public code of nations." United States v. The La
Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551),
overruled on other grounds, The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66
(1825).
If the First Congress had wanted to limit the district courts'
jurisdiction under the ATS to existing violations of the law of nations,
it could have enumerated them just as Blackstone had. 4
BLACKSTONE, supra, at *68. When the Continental Congress
made its recommendation to the States in 1781, it did list several
violations of the law of nations but took care not to make the list
exclusive, specifically recommending that each State appoint a
tribunal "to decide on offences against the law of nations, not
contained in the foregoing enumeration." 21 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra, at 1137. It was in this same
spirit, and with the understanding that the law of nations had evolved
and would continue to do so, that the First Congress expressly
provided that the district courts were to have jurisdiction over "all
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causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations." 1 Stat. at 77 (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
The history and text of the ATS establish that no further
congressional authorization is necessary for aliens to bring suit and
that jurisdiction under the ATS extends to "all causes where an alien
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."
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